according to Bernard Bailyn, illegal flows were integral to the working of the intensely competitive Atlantic system. 3 Despite heightened awareness of the porousness of national boundaries there has been relatively little analysis of how economic cooperation functioned in illicit trade but it is clear that its importance complicates narratives of 'modernization' which find favour with many economists. According to Douglas North and his followers, the development of long-distance trade required an institutional evolution in which traditional, communitarian, and supposedly inefficient, private-order institutions, gave way to modern, individualistic, and efficient markets characterized by impersonal corporations and state-backed contracts.4 Illicit trade does not fit the story. Of necessity, smugglers eschewed formal contracts and were reliant on private order institutions for enforcement which created new opportunities for traditional forms of business organization, such as the merchant diaspora, to adapt, survive, and flourish. Although the work of Avner Greif, and others, has stimulated debates about the role of rules, beliefs, and norms in longdistance trade most economists consider that they were outperformed by impersonal, individualistic institutions in a process of 'modernization'. For example, in Grief's work, the modern Genoese institutions outperformed the Maghribis. For a summary of his arguments developed over two decades see Avner Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade (Cambridge, 2006 ).
An examination of Jamaica's contraband commerce highlights the costs and risks attached to the defiance of mercantilism and the difficulty of securing trust across imperial boundaries. As English merchants struggled to make a profit, the economic arguments for opening island doors to members of the strategically networked Jewish diaspora proved persuasive and a small group of Sephardic merchants played a prominent role in establishing Jamaica's illicit trade.5 Yet, as Francesca Trivellato has forcefully demonstrated, the diaspora did not conform to common stereo-types and was not an 'idyllic consortia of cooperative kith and kin' any more than it was an 'inefficient relic of a pre-modern world'. Any assessment of the reasons for the Sephardim's success should avoid totalizing explanations which conceive of trustworthiness as an inate attribute of kinship, ethnicity, or religion.6
Family, countrymen, and co-religionists can often disappoint each other and any 'ethnically homogeneous middleman group' needs to develop a strategy which is appropriate to its context.7 In the case of the Jamaican Sephardim, they built on a favourable geographical and historical legacy and used restrictions on entry, high mobility, good information and credible punishment power to develop an intense 5 Josiah Child expressed the common view that religious toleration and an open policy towards aliens and 'even Jews' had contributed to Dutch commercial success. Josiah Child, A new discourse of trade (London, 1698), p. 103. 6 Francesca Trivellato, 'Sephardic merchants in the early modern Atlantic and beyond: toward a comparative historical approach to business', Richard Kagan and Philip Morgan, eds., Atlantic diaporsas. Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the age of mercantilism, 1550-1800 (Baltimore, 2009) pp. 99-122. 7 Janet Landa drew on field work in south east Asia to argue that in an environment with a weak legal infrastructure and positive transaction costs, a 'rational' trader, will choose trading partners with shared and easily identifiable kinship and ethnic characteristics. Janet Landa, 'A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group: An institutional alternative to contract law', Journal of Legal Studies, 10 (1981) , pp. 349-362.
'diasporic sociability' which gave them important competitive advantages in a highrisk business environment. 8 
I
Cromwell launched an ambitious attack on Spanish America in 1655. After a humiliating defeat at Hispaniola, the English forces seized the smaller and much poorer island of Jamaica by way of a consolation prize. Initial disappointment soon gave way to high hopes that the island would prove a valuable asset as it was situated 'within [the Spaniards] bowels', straddling the richest trade routes, and within easy sailing distance of their major ports.9 Jamaica would provide an ideal base for a trade which would allow the English to profit from Spanish America's wealth without the labour and expense of working the mines. 10 From the first Discoveries, the Spanish empire was seen as a source of almost limitless riches. The fabled wealth of the Peruvian and Mexican silver mines was seen to falter in the early seventeenth century, but it recovered and, between 1660 and 1700, annual average output of Spanish American silver has been valued at £2.5 million and far exceeded that of any other New World commodity including sugar.11
A population of six to eight million (compared with around 400,000 in British 8 Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert , 'La Nacion among the nations. Portuguese and other trading diasporas in the Atlantic, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries', Kagan and Morgan, eds, Atlantic diasporas, pp. 75-98. 9 16 Not only did Spanish colonists pay high prices for enslaved workers but the trade provided cover for contraband commerce and the perceived value of this chink in the Spanish imperial wall does much to explain the very high esteem in which the slave asiento was held. Until mid-century, the English were ill-placed to compete with the Dutch as their early settlements were on the eastern periphery of the Caribbean and, given the wind system, they had poor access to Spanish markets. However, Jamaica was admirably well suited to serve as an emporium for Spanish American trade. Despite the high hopes of easy profits, the direct contraband trade proved tricky: transactions costs were high and profit margins slim.25 Smugglers were, of course, subject to all the perils of legal commerce. It was difficult to match supply and demand, as fashion was fickle, and consumer tastes changed. The small, competitive markets in which the Dutch, French and other nations vied with the English for a share, were often over-stocked and goods had to be unloaded at a loss or returned unsold. 26 In addition, smugglers had to risk making bargains without assistance from resident agents or the written documentation expected in legal exchange. Care was taken to avoid incriminating paper trails at every stage of the trade. Supercargoes might carry letters for Spanish merchants but they did not carry invoices or bills of exchange in either direction and little was copied into the letterbooks which were usually produced as evidence in court cases. Transactions on the coast rested on verbal agreements and, on return home, the supercargoes did not provide written accounts.27 Smugglers had limited recourse to formal contract enforcement if they were cheated by traders on either side of the border.
Furthermore, if they were betrayed and information was passed to an official, goods 25 were liable to confiscation, and although the trader might obtain restitution, they would be made to 'to pay through the nose for it'.28 It was important to have access to inside influence and information.
Risks were especially high at sea. As foreign interlopers expanded trade in the late seventeenth century, the Spanish colonial authorities were authorized to take retaliatory action against 'the pirates' and commission coast guards who seized any vessel carrying so-called 'Spanish' commodities.29 Smugglers not only lost their ship and goods but also their liberty and, in 1681, the Jamaican governor reported that twelve island vessels had been taken in the previous nine months and that between 300 and 400 Englishmen were being held 'as slaves' in the Spanish Indies.30 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the mutual hostilities increased in the eighteenth century and, in 1718, Governor Lawes complained that 'pyrates have lately taken up of thirty sail of ships and vessels trading to and from this island'. 31 Smugglers attempted to improve risk management and reduce transactions costs at every stage of the trade. They sought current information about consumer preferences and market conditions.32 They employed reputable and experienced captains and super-cargoes to accompany the goods and devised profit-sharing arrangements to reduce opportunism and encourage good performance: the price of 28 goods was fixed in advance and, if goods were sold, the sloop and supercargo retained half the profit but, if the goods were unsold, the owner paid no freight or charges.33 Vessels were well-armed and heavily manned (at double wages).34 Many sailed in fleets of four or five and some secured naval convoy although they paid a hefty fee for protection (in 1718, naval captains charged 12.5 per cent for protection and 5 per cent on sales as commission).35
On the coast, everything was done to promote 'uneasy trust'.36 Although English merchants could not settle permanent agents, they made efforts to establish regular trading partnerships, monitor reputations, and, above all, to forge reliable links with office-holders in the colonial administration.37 Nathaniel Uring, a merchant who traded on the coast at the end of the War of Succession, described how all negotiations were conducted in Spanish, performed face-to-face, and with the Spaniards. The continued disparity between entries and clearances in the 1680s suggests that this ratio was maintained and the largest ships from Europe, such as the Blue Dove, carried cargoes valued at above £6,000. In addition, the island's own sloops had 'little designs with the Spaniards' which, in 1679, were valued at around £20,000 a year. 43 Evidence from the Royal African Company's records shows that over a third of the Africans delivered to the island in the 1680s were resold to Spanish buyers and this trade provided cover for a comparable trade in dry goods and provisions.44 A government report claimed that, in 1706, Jamaica exported English goods and slaves to the value of £275,000 to Spanish America. 45 In 1690, Jamaica's bullion exports to England, earned largely in illicit trade, were reputed to be worth above £100,000 and rose to £150,000 a year in 1700 and cochineal.46 Although contemporaries claimed that the island's trade suffered from the South Sea Company's monopoly, it is clear that contraband commerce continued at high levels although much went through different channels. It was with some justice that Jamaica was commonly portrayed as England's 'silver mine'.47 III According to contemporary commentators such as Governor Lynch much of the island's hard-earned success in the difficult contraband trades could be attributed to the activities of a small group of Jewish settlers who began to move to the island almost immediately after first settlement.48 These migrants were drawn from a highly mobile Sephardic population descended from Iberian Jews who had been forcibly converted in the late fifteenth century, and had sustained further outflows from the peninsula either to escape religious persecution, or in search of economic betterment, or a combination of both.49 They developed a compact, where, from the early seventeenth century, they were allowed to practice their religion in the open.50 After more than a century of making their faith invisible in the peninsula many chose to recover ancient practices and rebuild a public Judaism with customs and rituals which promoted community cohesion but set them firmly apart from the majority population. As Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert has skillfully shown, this self-styled 'nation' combined commercial dynamism and a composite religious culture born of 'conversion, exile, survival, and recovery' which, in many cases, supported fluid identities across territorial boundaries. 51 The Sephardim played a major role in developing contraband trade in Dutch (Oxford, 1985) . 53 'Now in this dispersion….[the Jews] credit one another; and by that means they draw the Navigation where-ever they are, where with all of them merchandizing Restoration government was persuaded, and with an urgent need to attract people and capital to the infant colonies, Jews who could secure patronage at court and pay a fee of £60 or so, were able to obtain patents of endenization which gave them rights to trade on the same terms as Englishmen.54 By 1700, there were probably between 2,000 and 3,000 Jews scattered around the empire including about 900 in London.55
In 1661, a 'French' Jew, Jacob Joshua Bueno Henriques, who had spent two years in Jamaica after its capture by the English, promoted his case for endenization and having perfect knowledge of all the kinds of Moneys, Diamants, Cochinil, Indigo, Wines, Oyle, and other Commodities, that serve from place to place; especially holding correspondence with their friends and kinds-folk, whose language they understand; they do abundantly enrich the Lands and Country's of Strangers, where they live', quoted in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz , The Jew in the modern world: a documentary history, 2 nd edn. (New York, 1995), p. 11. 54 Calvin's case, 1608, laid down the English law of nationality. Those born in England, or in countries under the king's dominion, were subjects. All others were aliens and lay under disabilities: they could not own, lease, or inherit real property in England or bring legal action that related to real property; they had no political rights and could not hold office; they were subject to customs duties imposed upon aliens and could not qualify as English under the Navigation Acts. Aliens could apply for naturalization by a private Act of Parliament which granted virtually all the privileges of a subject but petitioners had to have received the sacrament and were required to take oaths which excluded Jews. A grant of denization from the crown, as an exercise of its prerogative power, in the form of a Letter Patent, provided Jews with an alternative and removed the inability to hold real property, but not always the liability to pay aliens' customs duties, as rights varied with the wording of the particular instrument. The geographic reach and decentralized structure of the Sephardic diaspora is seen in the backgrounds of the group of 'free' Jews who settled in Jamaica by 1672. Nine of the thirteen can be identified from court cases and other sources (Table 1) and although all but the Spanish Alvarez family (father and son) identified themselves as 'of Portuguese extraction' their birth-places were dispersed: three were born in Portugal, three in France, two in Spain, and one in Amsterdam. All had led peripatetic lives.99 Most had moved between, at least, three countries (including Jamaica) in the previous 10 years. Between them, they had gained first-hand experience of, at least, eleven countries including Barbados, Brazil, the Canaries, the Dutch Republic, France, Italy, New York , Portugal and Spain. At least two thirds of them had lived for some time in the Iberian peninsula where they would have had to assume a Christian identity. All had passed through London, though often for a very short time, and obtained patents of endenization with a clause which allowed them to trade on the same foot as Englishmen. All had agents in both London and in
Amsterdam (where at least four had close kin).
While benefiting from broad networks, Jamaica's early Jewish settlers had to work to mould a group of relative strangers into a cohesive community. Only four of the nine had a close kin connection: Abraham and David Alvarez were father and son; the partners Solomon Gabay and David Gomez married two Perara sisters and so were brothers-in-law. Although all had friends in common, none had first-hand acquaintance with every other member of the group before migration to Jamaica.
However, in adjusting to a new environment they clung together, and as Studnicki99Perara and Gomezsera v. Calloway, Sept. 1672, TNA HCA 13/77.
Gizbert has argued, they were able to draw on long experience of dispersion and mobility and well established strategies for strengthening ties between members. 100
Until the earthquake of 1692, almost all the Jews settled in Port Royal. The twenty or so families lived, worked, and socialized in close proximity, and according to testimony provided by a young merchant, Abraham Perara Delgado, the Jews met 'in company' on a daily basis. 101 In 1677, the leaders, including Moses Cardosa, purchased a plot in the middle of Port Royal on which they built a synagogue. 102
The building provided a symbol of collective affiliation, and difference, a public declaration of permanence, and an important social centre for the community, used for daily assembly and information exchange, as well as worship.103
Two new communities were formed in Spanish Town and Kingston after the earthquake, but all three were in a radius of twenty miles, and were in close communication sustained by overlapping membership and common interests, reinforced by a policy of strict endogamy which not only restricted access to the group but also necessitated high levels of intermarriage and the formation of dense 100 Studnicki-Gizbert, 'La Nacion among the nations', pp. 77-78. 101 In forging solidarity and social discipline the Sephardim deployed strategies common to the associational culture which flourished throughout early modern
Europe as all members of the growing bourgeoisie struggled to adjust to the flux and mobility of urban life and rapid economic and social change.105 Although Port Royal was notorious for its riotous and unruly life-style; the factionalism of economic, social and political life; and low levels of probity among the business community, the Sephardim stood apart. The Jews successfully promoted the type of conduct which is commonly associated with the protestant work ethic: abstemiousness;
thrift, and self-restraint. 106 However, the Sephardim reinforced their common-place sociability with rigorous adherence to a range of customs and rituals which had survived and been adapted from before the forced conversions and which set them apart. As seen in tomb-stone inscriptions they maintained their Iberian languages among themselves until the late eighteenth century. Gomez, a large-scale provision merchant trading from New York to the Caribbean and two of her sons also married Jamaican Jews who they met in the course of working as supercargoes in the family firm. 118 The strong family connections between Jamaica and New York Jews are reflected in wills with a third of the New York Jewish testaments from between 1700 and 1750 indicating a close family link with Jamaica.119 Links could be cultivated and maintained through conversations in written correspondence, as emphasized in David Hancock's work on the Madeira wine business, but the Jews reinforced these ties through frequent face-to-face contact.120Jewish merchants commonly travelled with their goods and benefited from direct contact with their customers. 121 Shared religion took these mobile merchants into the Sephardim's tightly confined social spaces wherever they were and ensured rapid transmission of knowledge of personal and business affairs which, at times, extended beyond Sephardic networks to Ashkenazi Jews who arrived in small numbers in New York and Jamaica and attended the Sephardic synagogue. 122 As with Amsterdam's 'global' Jews examined by Jessica Roitman, Jamaica's Sephardim did business with those outside their own community.123 They bought and sold goods to Christians; they undertook commission business for Christians;
and they hired Christian mariners. They also undertook business in partnership with well-placed individuals who could offer political capital. However, at points where most discretion and trust was needed, they relied on insiders, as in generally using Jewish supercargoes on the Spanish American coast. Good information about the moral and business conduct of members of their own small, close-knit island congregation, combined with knowledge of those overseas, to allow early detection of bad behaviour and group discipline was enhanced by the supervisory role accorded to Jewish leaders. Although records have not survived from the early congregation, it is clear that, like other Sephardic communities, the Jamaican Jews elected a governing board (Mahamad) which administered the community's affairs, appointed Rabbis, supervised religious and moral order, dealt with internal disputes, and represented community interests to the government. Leading merchants were also appointed to oversee the rating, assessing, and collection of the extraordinary taxes imposed at various times 'in the lump' from the 1690s: a role which provided them with detailed financial information about their co-religionists. 124 Early English Jamaica was notorious for low levels of business morality. 125 Houston left a colourful picture of the 'burlesque' of Jamaica's business world in the 1720s and claimed that in Jamaica it was 'reckoned no disgrace, or loss of credit, to fail in, or fall from your word, bill or bond'.126 He was scathing about the corruption of the island's legal system and the difficulties of getting redress for bad behaviour through the courts and his sentiments were echoed by the Jewish merchant Diego
Gonzalez who complained that 'it doe signifie nothing to go to law, for after you get judgement and your money goes in the Provost Marshall's hands you are as bad as before'.127 However, although the Jews did make use of formal contracts within the community, as seen in the Articles of Association between Gabay and Narbona, and did also, on occasion, use the courts to sue for debts, as in the case of Mears and de Lucena, they were generally able to avoid formal institutions and turn to internal mechanisms for settling disputes within the community.128
Wills and Deeds reveal that, at best, a damaged reputation within the community reduced access to group benefits such as apprenticeship, a good marriage, business collaborations, inheritance, and social welfare.129 At worst, disgrace threatened partial, or absolute, exclusion from the group which was akin to economic and social death. 130 While the forging of a closed and separate community, with distinct social practices, increased trust among insiders it also defined the Jews as a nation apart. The Hall brothers's business papers show that from 1687 to 1690 they had transactions with seven Jews, of whom four (including Moses Jesuran Cardosa) were large repeat customers but, although they made thirty three references to 'a Jew' in their forty seven letters, they never once endowed these individuals, even repeat customers, by name. -names here have been extracted from invoices and lists of debts131 The Jews were seen 'in the lump' and, at best, they were viewed with suspicion and, at worst, with envy and venom.
According to Houston they were 'the worst set of rogues that ever I knew ….a set of meer low-level thieves'. 132 It was difficult for an expelled Jew to form a new network or join the majority population.133 Outsider status not only promoted community cohesion among the Jews but also gave the Jewish elders a powerful disciplinary tool and, although early English Jamaica's congregation records have not survived, there is evidence that excommunication was a credible threat within the Sephardic diaspora especially in places with less integrated and highly visible communities.134 The capacity to better detect and punish opportunistic behaviour among their brethren gave the Jews a significant competitive advantage where legal enforcement was weak, or entirely absent, as in illicit markets. It could be argued that these economic advantages help explain why a stigmatized group persisted in maintaining its separate identity. If such distinctiveness had had only costs, and no benefits, it would be expected that the signaling traits would have died out through a Darwinian mechanism.
The economic value of high quality information networks and the capacity to curb opportunism cannot be computed with precision. Nonetheless, business records do demonstrate that these community assets allowed the Jews to reduce . 135 In the 1680s, Francis Hall, a Christian competitor, complained that 'I cannot tell how it is but the Jews hath their stuff and silk here so cheape that we sell but little at low prices' and he urged his correspondents to withdraw from trades where they were in competition with the Jews, Francis Hall to Thomas Brailsford, 11 March 1688/9, 20 Jan., 1689/90, Brailsford Papers, TNA C 110/152. 136 Brailsford Papers, TNA C 110/152; Simson Papers, TNA C 104/14.
competitive edge allowed the Jews to gain Christian customers which provoked the charge that the Jews did 'eat us and our children out of all our trade' and raised the threat of retaliatory action.137
Although the Jews had full property rights, they were excluded from voting in Assembly elections, or holding office above constable, and so lacked a voice in island government. 138 Thus the Jews were exposed to discriminatory measures such as the imposition of a separate tax on the community 'in the lump' at regular intervals from the 1690s.139 Nonetheless, leading Jewish merchants were able to limit the trade, most merchants found it difficult to survive in this high-risk environment but members of the Sephardic diaspora, a traditional, communitarian group, with strong private-order institutions, had competitive advantages which they exploited with vigour. Equipped with appropriate language skills, and long-standing links to the Iberian empires, the Sephardim did not scatter at random but rather chose to settle communities at Jamaica and other strategic points in the web of illicit commerce which distributed Spanish American riches around the Atlantic and beyond. Here, they did not rely on inate attributes of kinship, ethnicity, or religion but restricted entry and cultivated attributes which ensured that group behaviour could be carefully monitored, and high levels of social discipline maintained, with credible rewards and punishments which were reinforced by their outsider status. 
